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co-Management of electricity and Groundwater: 
an assessment of Gujarat’s Jyotirgram scheme
Tushaar Shah, Shilp Verma
In September 2003, the government of Gujarat 
introduced the Jyotirgram Yojana to improve rural 
power supply. Two major changes have since taken 
place: (a) villages get 24 hour three-phase power supply 
for domestic use, in schools, hospitals, village industries, 
all subject to metered tariff; and (b) tubewell owners 
get eight hours/day of power but of full voltage and 
on a pre-announced schedule. It has, however, offered 
a mixed bag to medium and large farmers and hit 
marginal farmers and the landless. This article offers an 
assessment of the impact of Jyotirgram, and argues that 
with some refinements it presents a model that other 
states can follow with profit. 
Despite massive public investments in canal irrigation, Gujarat agriculture has come to depend heavily on irri-gation with wells and tubewells. 
1 Backdrop
During the 1950s and 1960s, farmers used mostly diesel engines 
to pump groundwater. However, as rural electrification pro-
gressed, they began switching to submersible electric pumps es-
pecially as diesel pumps were unable to chase declining water 
levels. The major expansion in the use of electric pumps occurred 
during the late 1980s as the Gujarat Electricity Board (GEB) 
changed to flat tariffs linked to horse power of pumps. Until 1988, 
farmers were charged based on metered use of electricity. 
However, as electric tubewells increased to hundreds of thousands, 
meter reading and billing involved rampant corruption. Farmers 
also complained about the tyranny and arbitrariness of GEBs 
meter readers. 
The new flat tariff system introduced in 1988 produced major 
beneficial productivity and equity impacts on smallholder irriga-
tion. Since the marginal cost of electricity to tubewell owners 
was zero, they were induced to aggressively sell water to their 
neighbours, typically marginal farmers and sharecroppers una-
ble to afford their own tubewells. Competition among sellers 
pared down the prices of pump irrigation service in local infor-
mal water markets greatly benefiting the poor. Flat tariffs also 
expanded groundwater irrigation, increased the utilisation of 
tubewells and reduced the GEBs cost of metering and billing over 
electric tubewell connections. However, the ill-effects of a flat 
tariff were serious as well. It led to groundwater over-exploita-
tion. It meant that farmers had to pay electricity charges even 
during the monsoon when they used little irrigation. Most seri-
ously, flat tariff became sticky and gradually increased GEBs 
losses in supplying power to agriculture. These could have been 
controlled if the GEB had gradually raised the flat tariff in tandem 
with the increase in power consumption in agriculture. However, 
farmer lobbies strongly opposed government efforts to raise the 
flat tariff, leading to mounting losses to the GEB on the agricul-
tural account [Joshi and Acharya 2005].
Given the circumstances, the government had no option but 
to gradually reduce power supply to agriculture. During the 
1980s, farmers got 18-20 hours of three-phase electricity/day; 
this came down to 10-12 hours by the turn of the millennium. 
Moreover, the quality and timing of power supply deteriorated, 
too. Power supply came with low voltage, often during the 
nights  and with frequent trippings damaging motors. Poor and 
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inadequate power supply to agriculture became the key issue in 
Gujarat’s mass politics.1
The GEB also found it difficult to  ration power supply to tube-
wells without hitting power supply to domestic and other rural 
uses. Normally, single-phase power that can runs domestic ap-
pliances was provided 24 hours but three-phase power required 
to operate tubewells, grain mills and other heavy equipment 
was restricted to 10-12 hours. To beat this system, farmers every-
where in Gujarat began using capacitors (locally called ‘tota’) to 
convert two – or even single-phase power – into three-phase 
power to run their tubewells. This reduced the voltage down-
stream affecting the village community, while tubewells con-
tinued to operate unhindered for 18-20 hours/day. The rural 
society and its non-farm economy were held hostage by the bur-
geoning groundwater economy of Gujarat.  Power engineers 
consider capacitors to be the gateway to improved power factor 
(pf);2 but in rural Gujarat, farmers turned these into an instru-
ment for power-theft.
The way out of this imbroglio, it was commonly argued, was to 
meter tubewells, improve the amount and quality of power sup-
plied to farmers, and charge metered tariffs. Shah et al (2003) 
had, however, argued that, though correct in principle, taking 
this route in present conditions would resurrect the logistical 
problems of metering to resolve which Gujarat (and other Indian 
states) had changed to flat tariff in the first place. They argued 
that this would attract massive farmer opposition, and, if the ex-
perience in other states was any indication, imply political hara-
kiri for any leader who championed it. Instead, 
Shah et al argued for the second-best solution of 
separating feeders supplying power to tubewells 
from other rural feeders and undertaking intel-
ligent rationing of power supply to tubewells in 
a way that mimics a high-performing canal irri-
gation system. In particular, Shah et al recom-
mended that: (a) flat tariff on farm power use 
should be raised gradually to approach the aver-
age cost of power consumed by a tubewell; (b) 
low-cost off-peak night power should be judi-
ciously used to keep the average cost of farm 
power supply low; (c) intelligent scheduling and 
management of rationed  power supply to the farm sector should 
be the central element of the strategy of effective co-manage-
ment of groundwater and electricity use in agriculture. Shah et 
al anticipated that “Farmers will no doubt resist such rationing 
of power supply; however, their resistance can be reduced 
through proactive and intelligent supply management” by: (a) 
enhancing the predictability and reliability of power supply; (b) 
improving the quality in terms of voltage and frequency, and 
minimising trippings; and (c) better matching of power supply 
with peak periods of moisture stress. 
During 2001-02,  this proposal, henceforth referred to as the 
IWMI proposal, was presented and discussed in several work-
shops and conferences in Gujarat as well as in other states. In 
Gujarat, the IWMI proposal was shared with the minister of power, 
Gujarat Electricity Regulatory Authority as well as the chairman 
of the GEB. The IWMI proposal seemed timely since around then, 
Gujarat was in the midst of major power sector restructuring 
exercise with a loan from the Asian Development Bank (ADB). 
Power generation and transmission/distribution were unbundled 
with the latter task taken over by five regional power distribution 
companies, each mandated to operate on commercial principles. 
The key impediment in the exercise was farm power. The ADBs 
answer was metering of farm power supply. But in view of stiff 
farmer opposition, the government of Gujarat had to go slow on 
this move; as a result, the ADB suspended the release of the loan 
instalment. Instead of metering tubewells, however, in Septem-
ber 2003, the government of Gujarat launched the ‘Jyotirgram 
Yojana’, which included some of the key recommendations of the 
IWMI proposal but went far beyond them, and unleashed   a new 
wave of rural development in the state. 
2 Jyotirgram scheme
The Jyotirgram Scheme (JGS) was launched initially in eight dis-
tricts of Gujarat on pilot basis, but by November 2004, it was ex-
tended to the entire state. By 2006, over 90 per cent of Gujarat’s 
18,000 villages were covered under the JGS. This was a massive 
operation.3 It meant laying a parallel rural transmission network 
across the state at an investment of Rs 1,170 crore. Feeders sup-
plying agricultural connection were bifurcated from those sup-
plying to commercial and residential connection at sub-station 
itself. Meters on distribution transformer centres were also in-
stalled on both the sides of feeders to improve the accuracy for 
energy accounting [MGVCL 2007].  
Pre-JGS, at the lowest level, 11 KV feeders served a group of 
two to five villages wherein all connections in these villages 
(domestic, agricultural as well as commercial) were through 
this feeder (Figure 1). Post-JGS however, the feeders were bi-
furcated into agricultural and non-agricultural feeders. This 
meant that certain feeders only served farm consumers and con-
nections while the rest served the domestic and commercial 
customers. Meters on agri-feeders were meant to identify the 
source of any significantly-greater-than-expected demand. In 
rural Gujarat thus rewired, two changes occurred: (a) the villages 
began to be provided 24 hour power supply for domestic use, in 
schools, hospitals, village industries; (b) farmers began get-
ting eight hours of daily power supply but of full voltage and 
on a pre-announced schedule. Every village got agricultural 
power during the day and night in alternate weeks that were 
pre-announced. 
  
 All-uses 11 KV feeder
 Village 1 Village 2 Village 3
 A1 D1 C1 A2 D2 C2 A3 D3 D3
Figure 1: electricity Network Before and after JGs
11 KV agricultural  11 KV non-agricultural
 feeder feeder
 A1 Village 1 D1 C1
 A2 Village 2 D2 C2
 A3 Village 3 D3 C3
 A4 Village 4 D4 C4
 A5 Village 5 D5 C5
Before JGS After JGS
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JGS is held out as a win-win solution for everyone involved. 
Studies by the Institute for Rural Management and (IRMA) as 
well as by the Centre for Environment Planning and Technology 
(CEPT) narrated myriad ways in which JGS has improved village 
life [IRMA nd and Hemchandraacharya North Gujarat University 
2004]. Both these studies, however, glossed over the new dynam-
ic that the JGS had catalysed in Gujarat’s agriculture. In early 
2007, IWMI undertook a quick assessment of the impacts of the 
JGS in 55 villages spread over 10 districts with the help of local 
researchers. The study laid particular emphasis on its impact on 
Gujarat’s groundwater economy. This paper synthesises these 
case studies to evolve a first-cut assessment of JGS, and its lessons 
for co-management of electricity and groundwater. Our findings 
are in total agreement with the highly positive assessment of the 
IRMA and  CEPT studies: therefore, we deal with these in sum-
mary form but discuss in greater detail the agrarian impacts of 
JGS that have so far remained unexplored.
3 impact on Quality of rural life
Thanks to the JGS, rural Gujarat today enjoys 24-hour power sup-
ply of quality unrivalled in rural areas elsewhere in India. All our 
case studies uniformly attested that for common villagers of the 
state, JGS has resulted in tremendous improvement in the quality 
of daily life. Power cuts, which were endemic, have mostly gone; 
and so have voltage fluctuations. For a long-time before the JGS, 
rural life as well as economy were afflicted by unpredictable and 
frequently interrupted power supply of low quality that made it 
impossible to organise daily chores or economic activity. 
Women were constantly worried about securing domestic 
water supply; livestock keepers had to time milking and feeding 
of cattle according to power supply; schoolteachers and students 
were anxious about power outages while using laboratory equip-
ments, computers and television sets. During Gujarat’s hot sum-
mer, the inability to operate fans made the afternoon heat insuf-
ferable in schools, shops, workshops, homes and rural hospitals. 
JGS has helped to bridge a major divide between rural and 
urban life. Improved power supply has led to better drinking wa-
ter supply for longer hours, improved street lighting, use of televi-
sion, radio, kitchen gadgets and fans. Women in many villages 
used time saved from household chores in supplemental income 
generation. JGS paved the way for better functioning of schools, 
primary health centres, dairy co-ops, and better communication.
4 impact on Non-farm rural economy
JGS has given a big shot in the arm to existing and new non-farm 
economic enterprises generating new livelihoods and jobs. JGS 
has reduced the cost of non-farm businesses such as flour and rice 
mills which now do the same amount of work by consuming less 
power because they get full-voltage, uninterrupted three-phase 
power supply round the clock.4 Many of those we interviewed 
reported  30-35 per cent fall in their bimonthly power bill post-
JGS. Many rice mills owners we met increased their daily out-
put by three times, created more local employment opportunity 
and reduced maintenance and repair costs, breakdowns and 
working capital requirements. Many shops, especially those 
vending perishable food items, telephone exchanges and STD 
booths, computer training centres had to make significant invest-
ment in invertors or generators. Inverters and generator sets have 
by and large disappeared; and commercial outfits are now able to 
operate in a continuous manner. 
In Banaskantha as well as Bhavnagar villages, we found dia-
mond polishing units shifting to villages to save on expensive 
space in towns; the resultant demand for labour has been so 
strong as to create farm labour shortages especially during har-
vest time. In some of the villages, flour mills were running at 
great cost with diesel engines pre-JGS; now these have turned 
electric. In Bhavnagar district, JGS stimulated growth in employ-
ment, and wage rates, in diamond polishing, tailoring, knitting, 
cold drink, vending, welding and small oil mills.  Many women, 
unable to commute to urban centres of diamond polishing trade, 
have now begun to work in newly opened diamond cutting/ 
polishing units in their own villages. According to a local leader, 
“thanks to JGS, Bhavnagar villages have witnessed more pro-
gress and better incomes during the last three years than in 50 
years before”. According to another, “JGS has good and bad  things 
for farmers; but it has only good things for the village as a whole”. 
In most districts, electronic and electrical repair shops experi-
enced major improvements in efficiency and speed. Welding ma-
chine owners and tyre puncture shops improved their business 
substantially. Demand for electronic products – TV sets, DVD play-
ers, tape recorders – increased rapidly. 
There is one sector of the non-farm economy which, however, 
was hit hard by the JGS: the motor/pump repair and service in-
dustry. During recent decades, rural Gujarat has witnessed boom-
ing ancillary trade tied to tubewell irrigation. Some of this in-
volved drillers, rig owners, cement pipe manufacturers, gangs 
specialising in laying buried pipeline networks, specialists for 
taking submersible motors out of tubewells and for installing 
them inside tubewells, specialists for adding new columns to 
chase falling water levels. Some more had to do with mainte-
nance and repair of tubewell equipment, especially pumps and 
motors, manufacturing and installing capacitors (tota’s). This 
second trade proliferated as rapidly as Gujarat’s farm power 
supply deteriorated. Thanks to JGS, these pump repairing units 
and motor-winders have fallen on bad days. It is said that JGS has 
killed three birds with one stone: it has provided succour to tubewell 
owners by easing the huge burden of maintenance and repair 
that they had to shoulder all these years; it has saved GEB from 
big losses; it has also saved groundwater tables from receding. 
5 impact on tubewell Owners 
Farmers we interviewed welcomed five major changes that the 
JGS has brought about: 
(1) Continuous power supply: Before JGS, constant tripping in 
farm power supply made it impossible for farmers to keep their 
irrigation schedules. Frequent tripping wasted water and power; 
motors suffered increased wear and tear; tubewell owners, water 
buyers as well as hired labourers suffered forced idle time during 
the power outages. By providing power with greater continuity 
and fewer interruptions, JGS has benefited farmers. 
(2) Full voltage: Low and fluctuating voltages, in part due to ram-
pant use of tota’s by farmers themselves, was another problem. 
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This resulted in frequent burn out of motors, and high wear and 
tear. Post-JGS, it is almost impossible for most farmers to use ca-
pacitors, which besides improving voltage also helped to improve 
order and discipline in electricity use in agriculture. 
(3) Reliability and predictability:  Before JGS, farmers never 
knew in advance precisely when power would be supplied and 
withdrawn.  Tubewell owners  and their customers were always 
on tenterhooks, waiting all day for power to come so that they 
could begin irrigation. Auto switches were widely used on tube-
wells which got switched on as soon as power supply started. 
After the JGS, farmers get their ration of eight hours of power 
during a fixed time schedule, known to everyone, during day and 
night in alternate weeks, making irrigation scheduling easier for 
tubewell owners and their customers. 
(4) Externally imposed restraint: Some farmers  grudgingly re-
counted, that the JGS successfully attacked the common-property 
externality inherent in groundwater irrigation. It did this by 
effectively putting a cap on collective groundwater withdrawal, 
in a uniform and just manner. Farmers everywhere recognised 
that unbridled pumping of groundwater must eventually prove 
the highway to disaster; and that on their own, farmers would 
never forge collective self-regulation. JGS has done it for them by 
rationing power uniformly on all tubewells across the state.
A similar sentiment expressed about the use of capacitors (tota’s). 
Many farmers felt guilty about the use of tota’s  but used them 
simply because everyone else did so. Post-JGS, all farmers have 
been forced to give up on tota’s. With the separation of tubewell 
and non-tubewell feeders, use of tota’s to run tubewells has be-
come technically impossible for most farmers. Moreover, the use 
of tota’s is also vigorously monitored and heavily penalised.  The 
sense of relief was particularly notable in hard rock areas like 
Sabarkantha, where wells run out of water before pumps run out 
of power during a day. Before JGS, there was a mad race amongst 
tota-using tubewell owners here to pump as much groundwater 
as they could under a “use it or lose it” regime. By abolishing tota’s, 
the JGS took the first big step towards a sustainable groundwater 
management regime that most tubewell owners welcomed. 
(5) New connections: When the JGS was completed, the govern-
ment of Gujarat lifted the virtual embargo on new tubewell con-
nections and began offering new connections in a planned man-
ner depending upon the availability of groundwater and power.5 
In parts of Saurashtra, where the profusion of check dams and 
recharge structures have increased recharge to the hard-rock aq-
uifers, new connections were released. This was also the case in 
some parts of central and south Gujarat.
6 Negative perceptions of Farmers 
If the discussion so far suggests that all farmers are unreservedly 
happy with the JGS, nothing could be farther from the truth. In 
fact, the negative sentiment among farmers is stronger and more 
widespread than the positive feeling. Farmers viewed full-voltage, 
reliable power supply as nothing more than sugar coating for the 
bitter pill of rationed power supply. Particularly peeved were 
tubewell owners in groundwater abundant areas of central and 
southern Gujarat who operated their tubewells for up to 18-20 
hours daily using capacitors (tota’s). Now they are forced to make 
do with just eight hours.  Vibrant water markets have been cen-
tral to Gujarat’s groundwater irrigation economy, and essential 
for the viability of tubewell investments now for eight decades 
[Shah 1993; Hardiman 1998]. But these are now under siege, 
thanks to effective power rationing. 
Farmers we interviewed were bitter about promises unkept, of 
eight hours of continuous, full voltage, three-phase power.6 
Farmers still face frequent trips, lower than full voltage and ef-
fective hours of daily power supply of six to six and a half hours 
against the promised eight. Night power supply, every alternate 
week is another sore point: night irrigation is inconvenient and 
hazardous; and finding labour to work in the fields at night is try-
ing. The crucial issue, however, is effective rationing. Many farm-
ers complained that “it is unfair on the government’s part to di-
vert agricultural power for residential users. Agriculture is the 
back bone of the village economy. When agriculture itself is 
threatened, how can a village enjoy better life?” In Vadodara, 
farmers lamented that “the government has pursued rural deve-
lopment at the cost of agriculture”. In Dahod, tribal farmers com-
plained, “but for us farmers, Jyotirgram has benefited all else”. In 
Kheda,  all our respondents, including women members of fami-
lies, strongly felt that villages should not enjoy 24 hour power 
supply if it comes at the cost of agriculture. Some suggested that 
24 hours single-phase power should be supplied to the residential 
users; but three phase power line to industries and water works 
should also be separated, and a uniform 12 hours continuous 
power supply should be ensured to farm and non-farm producers.
7 impact on Marginal Farmers and the landless
The brunt of the adverse socio-economic impact of the  JGS fell 
on water-buying marginal farmers, tenants and landless farm 
labourers. This large section of Gujarat’s agrarian poor depends 
upon tubewell owners to sell them reliable pump irrigation at an 
affordable price; and ironically, the much-despised tota system 
ultimately benefited these classes. With drastic dimunition in 
pump irrigation sales, the agrarian poor are left in the lurch. We 
encountered only three situations where this did not happen. 
First, in water-stressed hard-rock areas like Bhavnagar where, 
thanks to limited availability of water in wells, pump irrigation 
markets here were all but absent even before JGS. Small and mar-
ginal farmers here were rain-fed before the JGS and they are 
rain-fed now, without any further worsening in their position. 
Second, in canal irrigated areas where canal irrigation, high 
tubewell density, high water tables and good well yields combine 
to make eight hours of power sufficient for meeting the villages’ 
irrigation demand. Post-JGS, terms of sharecropping have re-
mained largely unchanged, which means that landowners have 
absorbed the JGS shock. Third, in the prosperous and groundwater 
rich south Gujarat where most farmers had their own electrified 
bore-wells and water markets were limited. Post-JGS, what little 
pump irrigation trade existed shrank even further; although we 
found no major increase in water price. 
Almost everywhere else, our researchers found that marginal 
farmers and landless labourers were hit hard in several different 
ways: (a) groundwater markets shrank, and irrigation access to 
buyers declined; (b) pump irrigation prices in cash sales post-JGS 
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increased by 40-60 per cent or more everywhere; (c) landless 
labourers cultivating leased land faced reduced availability of 
irrigation; (d) they also faced reduced opportunities for farm 
work as total irrigated area declined.7 Often the bottom of the 
agrarian pyramid comprises of migrant tribal labourers, dalits 
and low castes who are often the least skilled and adapted to 
non-farm trades where JGS has opened up new vistas for growth 
and prosperity.   
8 assessment
Evaluations of JGS so far have focused mostly on the non-farm 
economy and the quality of domestic life – where JGS impacts are 
unambiguously salutary. Our study has a larger ambit in that it 
covers JGS’s impact on the political economy of groundwater irri-
gation in Gujarat. As a result, it also points out some negative im-
pacts that need addressing. Our assessment of the impacts of JGS 
on different stakeholder groups is summarised in the table.
In tribal districts like Dangs and 
Dahod, where the groundwater 
economy is small and primitive, 
JGS’ impact is noticed in the quality 
of rural life as well as in the non-
farm sector but its agrarian impact 
is subdued. Here, groundwater use 
in agriculture is small; exchange of 
pump irrigation service is often a 
kinship based transaction; and 
eight hours, if provided, is too much 
power supply for most wells which in any case operate often with 
diesel pumps. Here, then, people’s perception of JGS is entirely 
positive because they see its impact on shop keepers, artisans, 
local employment, PHCs, schools. However, the agrarian dyna-
mic of JGS comes to the fore only in areas where agriculture and 
rural livelihoods have come to depend critically on the working 
of groundwater markets.
8.1 political Master-stroke
JGS offers a case study of astute political management of inter-
vention in an arena surcharged with animated mass politics. 
International lenders and power sector professionals have been 
surprisingly naive in coming to grips with the politics of metering 
tubewells. A study of farmer attitudes towards tubewell metering 
by Joshi and Acharya (2005) in north Gujarat puts in bold relief 
the overpowering sense of antagonism and suspicion farmers dis-
played on the issue. Over the past decade, mass-based resistance 
to metering has put a spade in the moves by several other states 
in this direction. Yet, the ADB made universal metering a condition 
for its power sector reform loan to Gujarat; and in 2002, withheld 
the release of funds when Gujarat 
failed to make progress on metering 
tubewells.
The IWMI “second-best strategy” – 
designed to minimise farmer resist-
ance – too would have invited some 
resistance. However, the Gujarat gov-
ernment’s strategy of projecting JGS 
as an intervention to “to provide continuous three phase power 
supply to the rural area for upliftment of rural population”  
[EPD 2007] was a political master stroke to create a powerful 
rural support base to counter tubewell owners’ resistance to 
power rationing.8 
Before JGS, farmers, their families and most others viewed 
farmers as victims of a reformist government insensitive to their 
plight. JGS, however, won supporters even within farm families, 
and even amongst some farmers. JGS was not imposed; it was 
actually marketed to village communities; a village panchayat 
had to pay a registration fee of Rs 1,000 and 30 per cent of the 
cost of rewiring. It was first launched in poorest districts such as 
Dangs where its impact was bound to dazzle. It was also imple-
mented early on in prosperous districts like Anand with high 
water tables. Here, non-farmers placed a high value on improved 
power supply environment, and farmers were less worried about 
power rationing. Last to be covered were north Gujarat and 
Saurashtra districts where farmers 
would be hit hard by power ration. 
Village contribution was waved in 
all these “problem” districts with 
high groundwater dependence and 
low water levels.
JGS could do this because it rea-
lised that over decades, rural life – 
homes, shops, schools, public health 
centres – had become hostage to the 
groundwater irrigation economy. 
By far the majority could not realise that they had to suffer power 
cuts, low voltages, frequent outages and trippings largely because 
of tubewell irrigation. By seperating tubewells from the rest of the 
village, JGS liberated the village life and economy from the 
shackles of the political economy of power subsidies to tubewells. 
8.2 Jyotirgram and the energy-irrigation Nexus
Against its original objectives of improving the rural power 
scenario and the viability of the GEB, the JGS has proved an out-
standing intervention. During the past five years, Gujarat has 
emerged as one of the best performing states in the management 
of its power sector. The GEB is turning around, with its annual 
losses falling from Rs 2,200 crore in 1999-2000 to Rs 475 crore in 
2002-03 and perhaps even more since then.9 Farm power tariff, 
which stagnated at Rs 350 and Rs 500/HP/year for pumps less 
and more than 7 HP respectively, has been raised to Rs 800/HP/
year.10 Agricultural power subsidies were a millstone around the 
neck of Gujarat’s electricity industry. It is still an issue, but JGS 
has created a wherewithal to “manage” farm power subsidies 
within acceptable limits. As the IWMI proposal had pointed out, 
the problem with pre-JGS power tariff 
policy was not only that it led to large 
power subsidies; the problem was also 
that the government had no control 
over the volume of subsidy extracted 
by tota-using tubewell owners. With 
effective power rationing in place, the 
JGS has transformed a degenerate flat 
table: impact of the Jyotirgram scheme on Different stakeholder Groups
Stakeholder Group Positive (+)/Negative (-)
Rural housewives, domestic users +++++
Students, teachers, patients, doctors +++++
Non-farm trades, shops, cottage industries, rice mills,  
dairy co-ops, banks, cooperatives +++++
Pump repair, motor rewinding, tubewell deepening, etc - - - - -
Tubewell owners: quality and reliability of power supply +++
Tubewell owners: no. of hours of power supply - - -
Water buyers, landless labourers, tenants - - - - -
Groundwater irrigated area - - -
Figure 2: reduction in Gujarat Government’s electricity subsidies 
(in million $)
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tariff into a rational flat tariff, with the government having firm 
control on the total volume of farm power subsidy.
Since over 90 per cent of groundwater withdrawal in Gujarat 
occurs through electrified tubewells, electricity consumption is 
an accurate surrogate of aggregate groundwater withdrawal. 
Government figures suggest that farm power use on tubewells 
has fallen from over 15.7 billion units/year in 2001 to 9.9 billion 
units in 2006, a nearly 37 per cent decline, resulting into  halving 
of aggregate farm power subsidy, from $ 788 million in 2001-02 
to $ 388 million in 2006-07 (Figure 2, p 63), and a considerable 
decline in the aggregate groundwater draft.  True, some of the 
decline may be caused by two successive good monsoons in 2005 
and 2006; but there is unmistakable evidence of tubewell 
irrigation shrinking. 
8.3 agrarian impact
Dazzled by what 24 hour, three-phase power supply can do to vil-
lage life and non-farm economy, many lay observers and even 
researchers like IRMA and CEPT have glossed over the agrarian 
distress JGS has been causing. True, some of the reduction in 
groundwater withdrawal represents saving of waste; but a good 
deal more represents reduced irrigation, lost output, livelihoods 
and employment. The angst this is causing among the farming 
community is all too clear from the accounts provided by our re-
search partners. But the depth of the angst is not uniform as sug-
gested in Figure 3. 
The key determinants of farmer angst are size of the landhold-
ing and the nature of the aquifer. In  depleted alluvial aquifers of 
Mehsana and Patan, where deep tubewells can be pumped, far-
mers continuously feel adversely affected because the power 
ration restricts their area irrigated. But farmers in hard-rock 
areas are less affected because the unavailability of water in their 
well during a day is more of  a binding constraint on their pump-
ing than the hours of daily power supply. 
Small farmers owning tubewells are happy with improved 
power quality although they miss their water selling business. 
Landless sharecroppers and water buyers are adversely affected 
everywhere because water markets have shrunk and water prices 
have soared 40-60 per cent, driving many of them out of irrigated 
agriculture. The full import of rationed power supply has yet not 
been felt by the farmers because 2005 and 2006 were both good 
monsoon years when wells were full and water levels close to the 
ground. Come a drought year, and farmers will find the JGS 
ration of power inadequate to meet their irrigation needs. 
It is very likely that Gujarat’s agriculture is still in the transitory 
phase of adjusting to the post-JGS groundwater irrigation regime. 
Our hypothesis is that post-JGS, farmers will increasingly turn to 
water saving crops and irrigation technologies, experience re-
newed interest in gravity flow irrigation and give a new impetus 
to water harvesting and groundwater recharge work that can im-
prove their well yields. The, government of Gujarat is already do-
ing a good deal to hasten movement in this direction. But more 
can and needs to be done to limit  farmer distress arising from 
rationed farm power supply.  A great deal of farmer frustration 
arises from promises un-kept. JGS promised farmers eight 
hours of continuous, full voltage daily power supply. These can 
be addressed by better housekeeping and tighter operational 
management. Pre-JGS, the GEB had perhaps some justification 
in not treating the farm user as a customer because he paid a sub-
sidised rate; but under JGS, real farm power subsidies are a fraction 
of what they were pre-JGS; and therefore, it is time electricity 
companies began treating farmers as customers deserving quality 
service. 
8.4 Who Benefited from Farm power subsidies?
It has always been a matter of intense debate in India that on 
precisely who centred the electricity subsidies under flat tariff 
benefit. Most analysts have argued that farm power subsidies 
essentially benefit the large farmers who own most electric 
tubewells. The analysis offered by Howes and Murgai (2003) for 
Karnataka was a classic statement of the perverse nature of the 
electricity subsidy under the flat tariff regime which distorted 
power economics, depleted groundwater and enriched the rural 
rich [also Narendranath et al 2005). 
All the evidence we collected suggests that the brunt of 
rationed power supply under JGS has fallen not on the tubewell 
owners but on marginal farmers and landless labourers. To as-
certain this position better, our research partners went back to 
their respondents for a second round of enquiry. This con-
firmed that post-JGS, groundwater irrigation through water 
markets has seriously shrunk in many districts, hitting the wa-
ter buyers hard. In response to rationed power supply and the 
abolition of the use of the tota, tubewell owners have made 
good their loss from the reduced volume of pump irrigation 
sales by a 30-60 per cent increase in pump irrigation price, 
reduced the cost of wear and tear and enhanced bargaining 
power to make favourable deals with marginal farmers and 
sharecroppers. It is the latter who have lost from the abolition of 
the ‘tota’ system and from the shrunken pump irrigation markets. 
This is evident in reduced opportunities to do irrigated share-
cropping, and in marginal farmers being eased out of the pump 
irrigation economy. The JGS experience shows that controlling 
electricity subsidies and groundwater overdraft do not come 
without a significant social cost in the form of growing immiseri-
sation of the agrarian poor.
The government of Gujarat has made metered tariff mandatory 
for all new tubewells. Our studies also suggest that metering too 
 
Figure 3: Jyotirgram’s impact on Diverse sections of Gujarat’s Farming community
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comes with a “welfare cost”. This is because metered tubewell 
owners manifest a markedly less interest in selling water to their 
poor neighbours than flat tariff paying tubewell owners even 
though the former pay highly subsidised rate per kWh.  In Rajkot, 
after the JGS, “farmers having meter-charged power have stopped 
selling water”. In Kheda,  our researcher wrote, “it is true that 
metered tubewell owners are less interested to sell their water 
when compared to flat tariff tubewells”. In Sundha village of 
Banaskantha, we found farmers with 20 hp flat tariff tubewell 
“sell at Rs 40/hour while Rs 60/hour is taken by metered tube-
well owners with 20 hp pumps”. In Patan district, our research 
partner wrote: “tubewell owners under flat charge sell more to 
other farmers and irrigate more land but those with meters use 
their tubewells only for their own irrigation and prefer not to 
give water to other farmers…they are always conscious that the 
meter is running and therefore refuse to irrigate others’ land…”. 
In Anand, “farmers having flat rate electricity connection max-
imise their sale through reducing water rates, provided a buyer is 
available…”. Our researcher found the water-price formation to 
be a complex affair but “generally, flat rate connections supply 
water at a cheaper rate than metered connections”. In Sabarkan-
tha, “metered tubewell owners are less prepared to sell water 
while flat rate tubewells are more eager to sell provided they 
have surplus power.. .In Bavsar village, flat rate tubewells of 
10-15 hp sell water at Rs 25-30/hour while metered tubewell 
owners charge Rs 35-40/hour.” 
In course of our interactions, a major area of farmer concern 
was the growing tension between farmers and distribution com-
pany field staff. Our research partners felt that the electricity 
companies need to allay farmers’ 
fear of their staff, especially now 
that the practice of using capacitors 
is nearly abolished. Before 1988, 
farmer resistance to metering arose 
in some part because of the tyranny 
and arbitrariness of the 
meter readers. Flat tariff was com-
forting because it minimised the con-
tact between farmers and electricity 
board staff and contained the latter’s 
arbitrariness. We found that this 
antipathy is returning. 
An area of priority action should be to establish a relationship 
of trust between farmers and electricity company staff. One way 
to do this is to rethink the purpose of metered tariff collection in 
a regime of stringent power rationing. When power consumption 
at feeder level is tightly metered and monitored, metering each 
tubewell offers limited scope to improve energy budgeting and 
accounting. However, from the viewpoint of improving irrigation 
access to the agrarian poor and reducing farmers’ antipathy to-
wards distribution company field staff, metering of tubewells 
may have serious adverse impacts. 
Even if tubewells are metered for energy audit purposes, if 
their owners are subjected to flat tariff, their behaviour would 
change instantly: instead of reticent water sellers charging high 
monopoly premia from their poor buyers, metered tubewell 
owners in groundwater abundant areas would turn into aggressive 
water sellers expanding groundwater irrigation opportunities for 
the poor in their neighbourhood.   
8.5 the case for the last iWMi recommendation
The only recommendation of the IWMI proposal that the JGS did 
not incorporate was the need to target maximum power supply 
during periods of peak irrigation demand [Shah et al 2003]. The 
IWMI proposal argued that farmers’ derived demand for power is 
unlike that of domestic or industrial users who need 24-hour 
power supply. Farmers need power most on 30-40 days of the 
year when their irrigation need peaks. A farm power regime that 
supplies maximum power to agriculture on those carefully se-
lected 30-40 days and reduces daily power supply during the 
rest of the year to a maintenance ration of 3-4 hours would help 
farmers more than a uniform eight hours/day of power supply. 
Under JGS, the government has committed to supplying 2,880 
hours of farm power/year. There are a number of ways this same 
quota can be delivered to maximise its beneficial impact on the 
agrarian poor and on agriculture as a whole.  In order to surface 
farmers’ preferred season-adjusted power supply schedules, in 
our second round of enquiry, we asked our respondents to allocate 
an annual ration of 3,000 hours of farm power (at 8.30 hours/
day) over the 12 months. The responses we received showed con-
siderable variations across districts; however, everywhere,  farm-
ers  allocated more hours to November-March months than the 
rest of the year. Aggregating the preferred schedules provided by 
all the respondents suggested two distinct patterns displayed in 
Figure 4: (a) in a year of normal or good monsoon, farmers would 
like power-hours reduced during 
kharif and increased to 11-12 hours/
day during rabi season and eight to 
nine hours/day during summer; (b) 
during a drought year, however, 
farmers would like 12-14 hours/day 
during kharif, 10-11 hours/day dur-
ing rabi and a smaller ration of five 
to six hours/day during summer 
months. 
Another way power supply regime 
can be fine-tuned to create value for 
farmers is to adjust it to regional 
hydro-geological specificities. True, matching rationed power 
supply to each individual farmer’s need is impossible; but it is 
possible to make adjustments according to broad regional pa-
rameters. In hardrock areas, where wells run out of water after a 
few hours of pumping, it would help farmers a great deal to 
provide their power rations in two daily shifts, as is already be-
ing done in some parts of Sabarkantha.
9 Grand promise of Jyotirgram
In our assessment, the JGS has pioneered real time co-management 
of electricity and groundwater irrigation. It has unshackled do-
mestic and non-farm rural electricity supply from the clutches of 
the insidious political economy of farm power subsidies. Its highly 
beneficial and liberating impacts on rural women, school children, 
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
June July August Sept Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar April May
Figure Aggregated Preference of Farmers about daily power 
supply during different months
Average-normal monsoon Average: Drought Year
Average in normal monsoon year
Average in drought year
Figure 4: aggregated preference of Farmers about Daily power supply 
during Different Months (in hours/day)
special article
february 16, 2008 EPW  Economic & Political Weekly66
village institutions and the quality of rural life are all too evident. 
Its impact on spurring the non-farm rural economy is incipient 
but all indicators suggest that this will be significant and deepen 
over time. Thanks to the JGS, Gujarat is well on its way to putting 
its electricity industry on a sound footing in just over five years. 
Thanks also to the JGS, Gujarat now has a kind of switch-on/off 
groundwater irrigation economy in which the administration has 
a powerful handle for groundwater demand management. Else-
where, governments have tried, mostly in vain, to manage 
groundwater by making laws that are unenforceable, or by vague 
notions like tradable groundwater rights. 
Gujarat under the JGS has shown that effective rationing of 
power supply can indeed act as a powerful, indeed all powerful, 
tool for groundwater demand management. It can be used to re-
duce groundwater draft in resource-stressed areas and to stimu-
late it in water-abundant or water-logged areas. It can be used to 
stimulate conjunctive use of ground and surface water. It can be 
used to reward “feeder communities” that invest in groundwater 
recharge and penalise villages that overdraw groundwater as if 
there is no tomorrow. 
A big breakthrough is the control government now has on the 
size of the farm power subsidy: pre-JGS, tota-using tubewell 
owners subject to flat-tariff availed of all the power they wanted 
with the government and electricity board being helpless by-
standers. Now, the tables are turned; tubewell owners have to 
manage with the power they are provided. In this sense, JGS has 
transformed what was a highly degenerate power-pricing-cum-
supply regime into a rational one.   
JGS has a big downside: its brunt is borne largely by marginal 
farmers and the landless because of the shrinking of water 
markets and of groundwater irrigation itself. There is no way 
of eliminating this completely except by increasing hours of 
power supply – and subsidy – that tubewell owners everywhere 
are crying for. However, the JGS can significantly reduce the 
misery of the agrarian poor by adjusting the schedule of power 
supply to match peak irrigation periods, especially for the rabi 
season. Providing the daily power supply in two or more instal-
ments to respond to the behaviour of wells in hardrock areas can 
further help the poor. Charging a common flat tariff to all tube-
wells regardless of whether metered or not can also stimulate 
metered tubewell owners to share irrigation with the poor.
The JGS has lessons of enormous significance for eastern In-
dian states. That, under the  degenerate flat tariff regime, rural 
electrification is held hostage to farm power subsidy is nowhere 
more evident than in eastern India where the country-side has 
got all but “de-electrified” [Shah 2001], holding up rural deve-
lopment in that entire region. Orissa has tried to reverse this 
retrogression by metering tubewells; and West Bengal is pre-
paring to take that route. But this runs the risk of throwing 
out  the baby with the bathwater. Gujarat’s JGS experience offers 
an important alternate model which we consider superior in 
many respects.
Notes
 1 For a background to this entire problem, see Shah 
et al (2003).
 2 Motors running irrigation pumps have a pf of 0.7-
0.8, which the use of a capacitor can raise to 1. A 
100 kVA transformer can be connected to 26 mo-
tors of 5 hp with capacitors instead of 18 without 
getting overloaded. Capacitors improve the volt-
age and reduce the load on the transformer and in 
general curtail power loss in distribution. See, 
Prayas (2004).
 3 It involved total rewiring of rural Gujarat.  48,852 
km of high tension lines and 7,119 km of low ten-
sion wires were added. 12,621 new transformer 
centres were installed. 1.2 million new electricity 
poles were used. 1,470 specially designed trans-
formers were installed. 1,82,000 km of electricity 
conductors and 6,10,000 km of low tension PVC 
cables were used. 30,000 tonnes of steel products 
were used.
 4 Thus, non-farm units making illegal use of tota’s 
paid commercial rate for power on metered basis 
and did not extract a subsidy, which tota-using 
farmers did.
 5 Every year, the government determines how 
many new connections can be given out in the en-
tire state depending on the groundwater level and 
power available. Allocations are made to districts, 
circles, divisions and feeders, an advertisement is 
put in the local newspapers inviting applications 
for new ‘Tatkal’ connections. The connections are 
then given out on a first-come-first-serve basis. 
Such a system ensures that the GEB has a fairly 
strong control over new tubewells in the state.
 6  ToI 2002. ADB Loan to Gujarat in Doubt, Times 
News Network, August 7, [http://timesofindia.in-
diatimes.com/articleshow/18397858.cms]
 7 See, Naya Padkaar, January 12, 2007, for an ex-
ample of these impacts in Dharmaj village of cen-
tral Gujarat where tubewell owners raised water 
prices from Rs 20/hour to Rs 50 post-JGS. 
 8 “The central purpose of this project...[is] to 
remove disparities between urban and rural areas 
in power supply and in other services available to 
the people” [MGVCL 2007].
 9 Madya Gujarat Vij Company, the new corporat-
ised version of GEB in central Gujarat made 
operating profits in 2005-06, for the first time in 
several years.
 10 This has not been easy with strong farmer organi-
sations resisting all moves to rationalise tariff. In 
2002, chief minister Narendra Modi tried to raise 
this from Rs 350-500 to Rs 1,260/HP/Yr and the 
move was immediately opposed by the Bhartiya 
Kisan Sangh (BKS). After sustained agitations, 
the rate was fixed at Rs 850/HP/Yr. For metered 
connections, the tariff remains Rs 0.50/kWh; and 
for Tatkal connections, it is Rs 0.70/unit.
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